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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HARRY KIRK CREAMER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND 
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appell'ant. 
Case No. 
7664 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This action is a suit for personal injuries brought under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A. 51, 
et seq. Plaintiff, Harry Kirk Creamer, brought this action 
against his employer The Ogden Union Railway and Depot 
Company for permanent damage to his heart allegedly 
sustained as a result of the negligence of the defendant in 
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causing the plaintiff's heart to be overtaxed and overex-
erted. The cause of action allegedly arose on the 11th day 
of August, 1949, at Ogden, Utah. The case was tried to 
a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
in the sum of $15,000.00. From this judgment the defendant 
appeals. 
The record on appeal contains all the proceedings in 
the action as we deemed it necessary to include the whole 
record for a complete understanding of the case. The rec-
ord citations used throughout this brief which refer to 
matters of evidence are taken from the page numbers of 
the transcript of the evidence contained in the record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Harry Kirk Creamer, the plaintiff in this action, was 
employed by the defendant, The Ogden Union Railway and 
Depot Company on August 21, 1946 as a coach cleaner 
(Tr. 13). Between that time and the date of the accident 
alleged, which was August 11, 1949, he performed the duties 
of a coach cleaner for his employer. His duties as a coach 
cleaner consisted of washing railroad cars and servicing 
trains. The servicing of trains included supplying the same 
with water and other supplies and also included the duty 
of icing cars (Tr. 14). This work was performed upon 
passenger cars and diners and was not connected with the 
handling of freight cars. At the time of his employment 
by the defendant the plaintiff was required to undergo a 
physical examination. This examination, made by Dr. 
Rulon F. Howe of Ogden, disclosed no physical defects. A 
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copy of the report made by Dr. Howe is Exhibit "4" con-
tained in the record (Tr. 132). It is particularly to be 
noted that the report made to the company disclosed no 
defects in so far as the plaintiff's heart was conce·rned. 
On August 11, 1949 the plaintiff was 36 years of age, 
was 6 feet 1 inch tall, and weighed 215 pounds (Tr. 66). 
He had never been sick for twenty years prior to that date 
(Tr. 12). In addition, the evidence disclosed that he had 
satisfactorily passed a physical examination at the Ogden 
Arsenal some time before his employment by the Depot 
Company (Tr. 13), and that he had performed manual 
work during most of his life (Tr. 12). The record also 
discloses that he had been active in hunting and fishing 
and other forms of athletic recreation (Tr. 68). 
On August 11, 1949 he was assigned to the task of 
icing diners. The methods of performing this work and 
also the extent of the work which Creamer did will be dis-
cussed in detail hereafter. At the end of his shift on this 
date and during the course of the ensuing night and day 
Creamer suffered a heart failure, which resulted in a per-
manent worsening of his heart condition for which dam-
ages are sought in this action. 
The medical evidence from plaintiff's doctor who testi-
fied as a witness, and also from the doctors who testified 
for the defendant establishes beyond any question that 
Creamer was suffering from rheum,atic heart disease prior 
to his employment by the defendant (Tr. 36). (The testi-
mony of the defendant's doctors corroborates our state-
ment.) This condition is caused by disease, which produces 
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inflammation of the heart and the muscles of the heart, 
resulting in scarring of the valves, and not by injury (Tr. 
23) . This scar tissue produced by disease is often a subtle 
thing with no symptoms at all (Tr. 26). It is not unusual 
that physical examination by a competent doctor will fail 
to reveal such a condition (Tr. 36). Such a condition does 
not always manifest itself during the life of the individual, 
but usually does so sooner or later, and the years between 
the ages of 35 and 45 are typically the period when failure 
of the heart occurs (Tr. 26). Usually failure of the heart, 
as distinguished from the rheumatic heart disease, is ac-
tually precipitated by exertion which the doctors classified 
as unusual and severe (Tr. 29). (This is confirmed by the 
testimony of Dr. Don D. Olsen for the defendant.) But the 
words "unusual and severe" exertion as used by the doctors 
refer to a type of exertion which is unusual and severe for 
a person with a damaged heart and do not mean that the 
exertion would be injurious to a person with a normal 
heart (Tr. 39). Any type of relatively strenuous effort may 
cause such failure of a rheumatic heart, whereas, the heart 
of a normal person will not be damaged by the same activi-
ty (Tr. 40). Both of the doctors who testified concerning 
Creamer's condition at the trial stated that he had suffered 
a permanent diminution of his working capacity in that 
the failure of the heart had permanently impaired its prev-
iously weakened and rheumatic condition. Dr. Don D. 
Olsen testified that the work which Creamer did on the day 
of the accident had probably contributed to the failure of 
his heart, but that this work, while strenuous, was not dan-
gerous to a person with a normal heart. We respectfully 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
submit that a summarization of the medical testimony 
concerning the nature of Creamer's so-called "injury", is 
as follows: 
1. The plaintiff was afflicted with rheumatic 
heart disease before he was employed by the de-
fendant. 
2. This fact was unknown to Creamer and 
to the defendant until after the heart went into 
failure in August, 1949, despite the fact that the 
plaintiff had been physically examined before that 
time. 
3. It is neither unusual nor indicative of any 
blameworthiness that such rheumatic heart condi-
tion was not discovered on medical examination. 
4. Strenuous work performed by Creamer 
for the defendant probably precipitated the actual 
heart failure, but did not cause the rheumatic heart 
condition. 
5. This strenuous work was characterized by 
Dr. J. G. Olson as severe and unusual and by Dr. 
Don D. Olsen as difficult exertion, but it is clear 
from the testimony of both of these doctors that 
what was meant by the language used was exertion 
which was excessive for a diseased heart, although 
not excessive for a normal, healthy heart. 
6. The actual work performed by the plain-
tiff on the day of the so-called accident was neither 
dangerous nor harmful to a normal person. Con-
cerning this matter Dr. Don D. Olsen's testimony, 
which is absolutely uncontradicted in the record, is 
as follows: 
"Q. Doctor, are you familiar with the work 
in icing diners down here in the yards of the 0. U. 
R. & D. Railway Company? 
"A. Quite familiar. I understand they carry 
ice up and put in the cars. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
"Q. In climbing ladders with a cake of ice 
weighing one hundred pounds? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Doctor, assuming a normal person, with 
no heart disease, and who is otherwise in good 
health, assume he is called upon to work during the 
course of approximately three hours to carry chunks 
of ice of one hundred pounds up a ladder of about 
fourteen feet high, I think the testimony is, and 
upon the top to break into smaller pieces and put 
down in the holes there in top of the diners. Assume 
the man who does that, he is about thirty-five or 
thirty-six years of age. He is in the neighborhood of 
6' 4" tall and he weighs approximately 205 pounds, 
I think the testimony is, and normally muscular; 
would that kind of exercise damage or in any way 
injure the heart of such a person? 
"A. I wouldn't think so. 
"Q. Is that overexertion for the heart of a 
normal individual? 
"A. No." (Tr. 126, 127.) 
The facts pertaining to the alleged overexertion which 
precipitated Creamer's heart failure are simple. At ap-
proximately 11:30 A. M. on the 11th of August, 1949, the 
plaintiff was assigned by his foreman to ice three dining 
cars. This work required that he fill bunkers on top of 
the diners with small chunks of ice. Alongside the various 
tracks where these diners had been placed other employes 
had spotted small hand trucks loaded with large cakes of 
ice, weighing approximately 300 pounds each. A photo-
graph of one of these hand trucks is contained in the file 
as Exhibit "2". It was Creamer's duty to cut these large 
pieces of ice into smaller pieces, which he could carry on 
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his shoulder to the top of a diner, where he would chip 
the ice into small fragments, filling the bunkers ( Tr. 18, 
74, 75). Creamer knew that the existing instructions from 
his supervisors were that each man was to choose the size 
of the piece of ice which he carried to the top of a diner. 
The instructions further provided that no one was to at-
tempt to carry a larger piece of ice than the man himself 
felt that he was able to handle (Tr. 42, 71, 72). Pursuant 
to these orders and in accordance with the custom adopted 
by various men who performed the same work for the 
Depot Company, Creamer made between 26 and 30 trips up 
a ladder approximately 14 or 15 feet high carrying chunks 
of ice weighing approximately 100 pounds each during the 
remainder of his shift on that day. In addition to this 
work of carrying ice up the ladder, he also chipped these 
100-pound pieces of ice into small chunks to feed them into 
bunkers at the top of the diners. There were actually three 
and one-half hours remaining on Creamer's shift when 
this work was commenced (Tr. 74, 76). Creamer knew that 
this was plenty of time for the job (Tr. 76), and he like-
wise knew that if he finished the task before 3 :00 P. M., 
when his shift ended, he would be permitted to quit work 
and spend the time getting himself cleaned up and ready 
to go home, although he was being paid until 3:00 P. M. 
(Tr. 76). That he was not rushed in doing this work is 
evidenced further by his testimony that at approximately 
1:30 P.M. he rested for a period of approximately one-half 
hour while smoking and talking with a friend, who was a 
fellow employe off duty (Tr. 50, 51). The fact as to this 
rest period was corroborated by his own witness, Louis D. 
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Waymen (Tr. 84). At the time when Creamer finished the 
job between 2:00 P. M. and 2:30 P. M. there was at least 
half an hour remaining in his shift (Tr. 75). At the con-
clusion of the job he became short of breath, was dizzy, 
and experienced the symptoms which are attached to a 
failure of the heart. It is perhaps significant that Dr. J. G. 
Olson, plaintiff's witness, thought plaintiff's heart had be-
gun to fail about ten days before this date (Tr. 35). 
Briefly summarized, the facts concerning the activi-
ties in which Creamer engaged which precipitated the in-
jury to his heart, are as follows: 
1. In a period of approximately three hours he car-
ried between 26 and 30 separate pieces of ice, weighing 
approximately 100 pounds each, up a ladder 14 or 15 feet 
high, to the tops of three different diners. 
2. He performed the work under express instructions 
that he should carry no larger chunks of ice than he felt 
himself capable of handling. 
3. At the top of these cars he chipped the ice into 
smaller pieces, about the size of a man's fist, and there-
after placed the same in bunkers. 
4. He set his own pace in doing the work, having 
plenty of time within which to do the job, and sufficient 
time to rest for at least one-half hour, and also to finish 
the job at least one-half hour before the end of his work 
shift. 
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Several witnesses for the plaintiff testified that the 
p\"ocess of icing diners was hard work, involving strenu-
ous demands upon the strength of workmen. Other wit-
nesses for the plaintiff testified that there were mechani-
cal devices such as fork lifts and other types of machinery 
which were capable of lifting ice to the top of a diner. 
Since we admitted at the trial and are now willing to con-
cede that machinery exists which is capable of lifting ice 
to the top of a diner, we see no point in detailing the testi-
mony in this regard. We likewise concede and the evidence 
shows that the work of icing diners is hard work. The 
evidence further disclosed that this manual method of icing 
diners had been used for many years; that more than 100 
different individuals had performed that work during the 
six years prior to the accident, and that women had done 
this work during the war years, although the women who 
had done the work had not been permitted to choose the 
size of the piece of ice which they were to carry to the top 
of a car. Instead, they had been required to carry a piece 
no larger than 30 pounds because the foreman understood 
that the state laws so required (Tr. 116, 117). 
The only express medical testimony concerning the 
effect which this work as performed by Creamer would 
have on a normal heart is to be found in the testimony of 
Dr. Don D. Olsen hereinabove set forth verbatim, wherein 
he stated that the work was not dangerous to a person with 
a normal heart. Therefore, we assert that evidence is com-
pletely lacking that the defendant required of its workmen 
the exercise of effort which was dangerous if the workmen 
were in a normal condition. 
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POINTS UPON WHICH APPPELLANT RE-
LIES FOR A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT. 
POINT I. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WHOLLY 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT ANY NEGLI-
GENCE OF THE DEFENDANT CONTRIB-
UTED TO PLAINTIFF'S INJURY. 
POINT II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 GIVEN BY THE TRIAL 
COURT AT THE REQUEST OF THE PLAIN-
TIFF ON THE SUBJECT OF DAMAGES CON-
STITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE 




AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WHOLLY 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT ANY NEGLI-
GENCE OF THE DEFENDANT CONTRIB-
UTED TO PLAINTIFF'S INJURY. 
(a) The negligence which plaintiff charged against 
the defendant: 
By his complaint plaintiff alleged that liability of the 
defendant existed on the following grounds: 
1. Negligence in requiring the plaintiff to pull 
heavily loaded ice wagons manually to and from 
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various positions along the platforms in the Ogden 
Yard without mechanical assistance. 
2. Negligence in requiring the plaintiff to car-
ry 100-pound cakes of ice on his shoulder up a lad-
der to the tops of diners, subjecting the plaintiff to 
unusual hazards and dangers of overexertion and 
overwork. 
3. Negligence in failing and neglecting to fur-
nish the plaintiff with a tractor or other mechani-
cal device with which to pull ice wagons along the 
platforms above referred to. 
4. Negligence in failing to furnish the plain-
tiff with a mobile elevator to lift the ice blocks to 
the tops of the diners. 
5. Negligence in failing to furnish the plain-
tiff with a conveyor belt to lift said ice blocks to 
the tops of diners. (R. 3, 4.) 
Stripped of the verbiage employed by plaintiff's coun-
sel, plaintiff's complaint charges the defendant with negli-
gence in requiring the plaintiff to overexert himself in two 
different ways when machinery could have performed the 
task. The first alleged overexertion is the handling of 
wagons loaded with ice along the platform, and the second 
is the carrying of ice manually to the tops of diners. Plain-
tiff's whole contention is that the defendant was guilty of 
negligence in requiring the plaintiff to perform these two 
tasks manually, rather than with the aid of machinery. 
(b) The facts as to these charges of negligence: 
The evidence concerning the work of moving ice wag-
ons along the platform does not have any significance 
whatever in determining the question of the defendant's 
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negligence. The plaintiff did not even suggest that he had 
overexerted himself in handling ice wagons on the day of 
the accident. Concerning the task of icing the first two 
diners on which he worked on August 11, 1949, the only 
mention which plaintiff made of moving ice wagons is to 
be found at page 49 of the Transcript, where he stated 
that he moved three or four small wagons partially loaded 
with two or three cakes of ice about 20 or 30 feet to ice 
the first diner. In icing the third diner on that date plain-
tiff testified that he moved another ice wagon approxi-
mately 100 yards with the assistance of two other men 
(Tr. 51). There is no testimony that this work constituted 
an undue burden upon the plaintiff's heart, nor is there 
any testimony that this work had any effect in precipitat-
ing the failure of the plaintiff's heart. In the hypothetical 
question which plaintiff's counsel asked of Dr. J. G. Olson 
concerning the cause of the failure of the plaintiff's heart 
no mention was made of any work in connection with moving 
ice wagons. Dr. J. G. Olson attributed the failure of plain-
tiff's heart entirely to the work which Creamer did in 
carrying 100 pound cakes of ice up a ladder to the tops of 
the three diners (Tr. 28, 29). In the absence of any evi-
dence from the plaintiff or from his doctor or any other 
witness that moving the ice wagons resulted in overexer-
tion or resulted in any failure of the plaintiff's heart, we 
respectfully submit that the only remaining theory of negli-
gence on which the plaintiff can possibly recover is the 
alleged negligence of the defendant in requiring the plain-
tiff to carry 100-pound cakes of ice to the tops of these 
diners without machinery to do the work for him. 
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The facts pertaining to the work which Creamer was 
asked to perform in carrying ice to the tops of the diners 
have bee!). heretofore set forth in some detail in this brief. 
It remains for us and for this court to analyze these facts 
to determine whether or not an issue was presented for 
submission to a jury as to the defendant's negligence. 
(c) As a matter of law the evidence in this case is 
not sufficient to establish the negligence charged: 
The negligence charged in connection with moving of 
ice wagons being completely unsubstantiated as heretofore 
pointed out, we confine our discussion to the possibility that 
the defendant was negligent in requiring the plaintiff to 
carry ice up a ladder to the top of the dining cars on the 
date of the so-called accident. Intelligent determination 
of the problem requires only the application of fundamental 
basic legal principles to the facts involved. As said by Mr. 
Justice Latimer, speaking for this court, in the case of 
Lasagna v. McCarthy, et al., 111 Utah 269, 177 P. 2d 734: 
"Negligence of the employer being the basis for 
recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
it is well to return to the ordinary definition of the 
term, which is 'the omission to do something which 
a reasonable person, guided by those considerations 
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human af-
fairs would do: or the doing of something which 
a prudent person under like circumstances would 
not do.'" 
Application of this well settled definition of the concept of 
negligence to the facts of the case at bar makes it obvious 
that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence which 
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would justify reasonable persons in arriving at the conclu-
sion that the defendant was negligent. The Depot Com-
pany neither asked nor required of the plaintiff that he 
do work which was dangerous to the health of a normal 
human being and exposed the plaintiff to no danger which 
either he or the defendant knew, or should have known, 
to exist. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the 
defendant neither omitted an act which a reasonable per-
son would have done, nor committed an act which a pru-
dent person would not have done. Because there is ma-
chinery in existence capable of eliminating the manual 
effort required to lift ice to the top of a diner, it does not 
follow that it is negligence to require that the task be per-
formed by manual labor instead of by use of the machinery. 
Proof that there are two methods of accomplishing 
the same task does not establish that either method is negli-
gent. That the first method may be quicker, easier or even 
safer than the second does not prove or establish that the 
second method exposes someone to an unreasonable risk 
and is therefore negligent. As was said by Mr. Justice 
Latimer in his concurring opinion in the case of John D. 
Marshall v. The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company, 
in ... Utah ... , 221 P. 2d 868: 
"The test to determine plaintiff's conduct is not 
whether there were safer places which could have 
been selected by him, but rather, whether or not 
under the facts and circumstances known to him he 
acted as a reasonably prudent person." 
The question in this case is not whether there exists another 
method of doing the work which Creamer did. The ques-
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tion is whether or not the method designated for Creamer's 
use deviated from the standard of reasonable conduct. 
Although the icing of diners admittedly requires con-
siderable effort on the part of the men who perform the 
task, there was no justification for the· contention that 
Creamer was required to abuse himself on the day of the 
accident in performing the assignment he had received. 
The work did not require that he make 26 or 30 trips up 
and down the ladder without rest and at high speed. Under 
the evidence the technique employed by Creamer in icing 
these diners was to carry several 100-pound pieces of ice 
to the top of a car where he would there chip the 100-pound 
pieces into smaller chunks, with a repetition of this process 
until a diner was iced. With a maximum of 30 trips up a 
ladder on three different cars, it is obvious that Creamer 
not only had the opportunity, but was compelled to space 
the actual climbing over a substantial period of time on the 
day of the accident. And the facts should not therefore be 
considered as though Creamer made or was asked to make 
30 consecutive trips without pause or respite. The effect 
upon a human being of any activity involving effort is 
always directly related to the speed at which the activity 
is performed. To walk 100 yards on level ground in five 
minutes is one thing; to run a 100-yard dash in ten seconds 
is another. Creamer admittedly finished the job at least 
one-half hour before the end of his shift, in addition to rest-
ing for one-half hour during the course of the job. It can-
not therefore be disputed that the speed at which he did 
the job was completely of his own choice. 
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In the absence of any knowledge that Creamer was 
suffering from a heart condition which made it foreseeable 
that he would suffer an impairment of his health in per-
forming the job to which he was assigned by handling ice 
of a size he chose and at his own speed, we respectfully 
submit that no jury could fairly say that the Depot Com-
pany chose a method of performing the work which a 
reasonable prudent man would have considered as danger-
ous, unsafe or improper. Not only is this fundamental prop-
osition unassailable upon a logical examination of the facts, 
but it is also abundantly supported by authoritative texts 
and decisions. 
In a rather complete annotation entitled "Liability of 
Employer for Injury to Employee due to his Physical Un-
fitness for the Work to Which he was Assigned", 175 A. 
L. R. 982, the annotator summarizes the law as follows, 
at page 985: 
"An employer is liable to an employee for in-
juries received in the course of employment, in the 
absence of statute declaring otherwise, only upon the 
ground of negligence on the employer's part. The 
employer is not an insurer of the safety of his em-
ployees, unless made so by statute, and is not liable 
for consequences of the dangers of the employment; 
in order to charge him with liability for injury to 
an employee due to the employee's physical unfit-
ness for the work to which he was assigned it is 
necessary to show negligence on the employer's part 
in assigning the employee to the work in question 
or in requiring him to continue at work for which 
he was not specifically fitted; this means that in any 
event the employer must know or be charged with 
knowledge of the employee's unfitness." 
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In l?olume 65 of Corpus Juris Secundum, at page 401, 
in dealing with this subject is the following statement: 
"In the absence of anything which should rea-
sonably suggest such a condition, one is not required 
to anticipate that another may, for some reason, be 
unable to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, 
but the duty to exercise special care with respect 
to a person, who is for any reason unable to take 
such care of himself as the normal person might, 
arises only where there is actual or imputed knowl-
edge of the incapacity. Accordingly, negligence can-
not be predicated on conduct which would have 
reached the standard of ordinary care with respect 
to an ordinary and normal person in the absence of 
any actual or imputed knowledge of any infirmity 
or incapacity of the person in question." 
American Jurisprudence states the rule in the follow-
ing language : 
"As hereinbefore stated, the duty to use care 
is based upon knowledge of danger. It is also true 
that the care which must be exercised in any par-
ticular situation is in proportion to the actor's knowl-
edge, actual or imputed, of the danger to another in 
the act to be performed. The degree of care neces-
sary to constitute the ordinary care required of a 
person upon any particular occasion is measured by 
reference to the circumstances of danger and risk 
known to such person at the time. Conduct which 
will be considered extremely careful under one con-
dition of knowledge, and one state of circumstances, 
may be grossly negligent with different knowledge 
and in changed circumstances. The consequence 
likely to be the result of an act or omission is a fact 
to be taken into consideration in determining the 
kind and amount of caution to be exercised. The de-
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gree of care required to be used in any given case 
to avoid the imputation of negligence must be ac-
cording to the circumstances or in proportion to the 
danger reasonably to be anticipated-such care as is 
ordinarily sufficient under similar circumstances to 
avoid danger and secure safety. Where a danger ac-
tually is foreseen, the duty is imposed to adopt every 
possible precaution to avoid an injury therefrom. 
It will be observed that ordinary care requires only 
that means be taken to avoid such dangers as are 
known or reasonably to be apprehended. In other 
words, ordinary care has reference to probabilities 
of danger rather than possibilities of peril. More-
over, the rule of reasonable. care must be considered 
not in the light of the accident which happened but 
with reference to that which ordinary prudence 
should have anticipated as likely to happen. The 
mere fact that an accident was avoidable does not 
prove that there was fault in not anticipating and 
providing against it." 38 Am. Jur. 678. 
It is well settled that the common law rule of ordinary 
prudence maintains under the Federal Employer's Liability 
Act. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Craven, 185 F. 2d 176. 
In that case the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals made 
the following observation: 
"The great majority of railroad accidents (in-
cluding those not involving negligence) could by 
some means be prevented. The test is whether rea-
sonable men, examining the circumstances and the 
likelihood of injury, would have taken those steps 
necessary to remove the danger. (Citing cases.) 
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the 
common law rule of ordinary prudence maintains, 
and a railroad is not necessarily required to employ 
the latest or the safest devices. (Citing cases.) 
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* * * * * 
"The chances of injury to plaintiff, however, 
were no greater than those inherent in his type of 
employment. At no other place in the yard was it 
negligent for the railroad to obstruct plaintiff's way 
with moving cars, or to fail to provide a bridge over 
the tracks. It cannot be said that a different stand-
ard of maintenance was required to protect plain-
tiff at that point where he entered upon or left his 
duties. The danger was no greater at this point 
and plaintiff, as a brakeman, knew how to avoid 
whatever danger that existed. It would have been 
unreasonable to expect the railroad to take those 
extreme measures necessary to remove this slight 
danger.'' 
A problem identical in principle to that in the case 
at bar was recently decided by the New York courts in the 
case of Owen v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co., Inc., 103 N. Y. 
S. 2d 137. In that case the plaintiff suffered from a chronic 
valvular heart lesion, with resultant low blood pressure 
and defective blood circulation. Her feet were frostbitten 
while traveling on defendant's bus, because the defendant 
permitted the temperature inside the bus to reach a point 
which her system was unable to withstand, but which would 
have done no damage to a normal person. In determining 
that the plaintiff had not made a case which should be 
submitted to a jury, although there was some evidence 
that the bus was equipped with a defective heater, the 
New York court said: 
"Plaintiff's InJuries did not come within the 
realm of reasonable foreseeability. Defendant was 
under no legal duty to guard against dangers which 
could not reasonably be foreseen. Negligence is to 
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be gauged by the ability of one to anticipate danger. 
The test of actionable negligence is not what could 
have been done to have prevented a particular acci-
dent, but what a reasonably prudent and careful 
person would have done under the circumstances in 
the discharge of his duty to the injured party. Fail-
ure to guard against a remote possibility of accident, 
or one which could not, in the exercise of ordinary 
care, be foreseen, does not constitute negligence. As 
phrased by Chief Justice Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R. R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. 
L. R. 1253 : 'The risk reasonably to be perceived 
defines the duty to be obeyed.' That no injury was 
sustained by other passengers demonstrates that 
there was no danger which could reasonably be ap-
prehended. Had defendant been advised of plain-
tiff's condition it might well have afforded her some 
form of additional protection. * * * To hold a 
carrier liable for injuries or illness to all persons, 
normal and abnormal, especially when the abnor-
mality is not known, would make a carrier an insurer 
of the well-being of all passengers. As yet the point 
has not been reached where such is the law. 
* * * * * 
"The cases cited by respondent are readily dis-
tinguishable. They all deal with foreseeable danger 
to normal persons and acts which would constitute 
negligence to normal persons, and stand only for the 
proposition that a party once guilty of negligence 
cannot escape additional consequences or damages 
because of a previously existing condition. Here 
plaintiff would not have been injured at all but for 
her previous physical condition." 
The opinion aptly expresses the basic distinction be-
tween those cases in which liability is imposed for aggra-
vation of a pre-existing condition and cases in which lia-
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bility is denied where such a pre-existing condition, un-
known to defendant, is itself the source of danger. To im-
pose liability for conduct which results in aggravating a 
pre-existing physical condition where such conduct would 
have been negligent as to a plaintiff if he were in normal 
condition, is a very different thing than to impose liability 
in a case where the unknown physical defect of the plain-
tiff is the only factor which makes the conduct of the de-
fendant dangerous at all. We think this distinction is par-
ticularly significant in the case at bar for the reason that, 
as stated by the New York court, "Here, the plaintiff would 
not have been injured at all but for his previous physical 
condition." 
In the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Willhite, 187 
S. W. 2d 1010, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
in 1945, the identical problem presented in this case was 
also decided. There the plaintiff had sued to recover for 
injuries sustained while in the employ of the defendant 
railroad as a result of alleged negligence in requiring him 
to lift cross-ties without providing a sufficient and adequate 
number of fellow workmen. It appeared from the evidence 
that the plaintiff had an enlargement of the inguinal rings 
and spermatic cord, which rendered him peculiarly suscep-
tible to a rupture or hernia at any time. This condition 
was not known to the defendant employer. In lifting ties 
the plaintiff sustained a hernia. The Kentucky court made 
the following statement concerning the law applicable to 
the alleged negligence of the defendant: 
"Appellant was not advised of plaintiff's con-
dition, and had the right to assume (plaintiff) to be 
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in ordinary physical condition. That being true, (de-
fendant) cannot be charged with negligence unless 
it is shown by the evidence that it failed to provide 
a sufficient number of workmen to assist a person 
of ordinary physique to perform in safety the work 
required." 
In the case of Bowing v. Delaware Rayon Company, 
192 A. 598, the Delaware courts stated the law as follows: 
"In this connection this is to be said: The de-
fendant is not charged with the knowledge that the 
plaintiff, at any time during her employment, was 
ill, or in a weakened condition, or otherwise pecul-
iarly sensitive to the gas, and therefore, owed her 
a duty not to expose her to it in any degree. From all 
the facts and circumstances, as alleged in the dec-
laration, and as shown by the evidence, the defend-
ant owed to the plaintiff that duty which, in the 
circumstances, it owed to the average worker in the 
reeling room, and it is not to be held responsible 
for injuries resulting from the presence of the gas 
in the room in a degree not harmful to the average 
person. For, generally, it is not the duty of a master 
to establish and maintain conditions which must be 
safe for every employee. The conditions must be 
reasonably safe for the average employee. If, there-
fore, you shall be satisfied that the plaintiff, if she 
suffered damage as a result of exposure to carbon 
disulphide in the reeling room, suffered it because 
of some peculiar sensitivity on her part to the gas, 
and if the concentration of the gas, if there was gas 
there, was not such as would have caused injury to 
the average person, then the plaintiff cannot re-
cover, for, in such circumstances, the defendant 
would not have been negligent as charged in the 
declaration." 
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Other courts have followed these well settled principles. 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Evans, 
(Texas) 175 S. W. 2d 249; 
Sowers v. Firginian Railway Company, (W. 
Va.) 133 S. E. 325; 
Hunt v. New York Central Railroad Co., (New 
York) 103 N. Y. S. 2d 355; 
Southern Rail1.oay Co. v. Bell, Sheriff, 114 F. 
2d 342; 
Warden-Pullen Coal Co. v. Wallace, (Okla.) 56 
P. 2d 802. 
The defendant made motions for a nonsuit, for a di-
rected verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, assigning as the reason therefor the failure of the 
plaintiff to produce evidence that the defendant was guilty 
of negligence contributing to the plaintiff's injury (Tr. 
107, 143; R. 53). These motions were denied by the trial 
court. We respectfully submit that the motions should have 
been granted and that the trial court should have entered 
judgment for the defendant because of the complete ab-
sence of any evidence of negligence on the part of the de-
fendant. No jury should be permitted to find that an em-
ployer is negligent because he assigns an apparently heal-
thy young man to do a few hours of hard work. The term 
"reasonable care" would then have a new meaning entirely 
unrelated to the actualities of human activity. If the as-
,.1 signment of an employee to do a job at his own rate of 
speed, handling objects of a size of his own choice, is negli-
gence, then the standards under which this country was 
built and exists have vanished. 
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POINT II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 GIVEN BY THE TRIAL 
COURT AT THE REQUEST OF THE PLAIN-
TIFF ON THE SUBJECT OF DAMAGES CON-
STITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE 
REASON THAT SAID INSTRUCTION IS AR-
GUMENTATIVE. 
We believe that this court should order that judgment 
be entered for the defendant for the reasons herein set 
forth. But we also seek the views of this court on one other 
matter presented by the trial of this case. Instruction No. 
15 was given to the jury by the trial court at the request 
of the plaintiff. This instruction was plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 7 verbatim. For the court's convenience 
we set forth its wording in full: 
"You are instructed that if you find the issues 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
it will then become your duty to award to plaintiff 
such damages as you may find from a preponderance 
of the evidence will fairly and justly compensate him 
for any injury and damage he has sustained as a 
proximate result of defendant's negligence com-
plained of by him. 
"In determining the amount of such damages, 
you are instructed that plaintiff is entitled to com-
pensation for all pain and suffering, if any, both 
mental and physical, which he has endured since the 
time he sustained his injuries and that he will prob-
ably endure in the future ; in determining compen-
sation for pain and suffering, if any, you make take 
into consideration its probable duration and its sever-
ity. The law furnishes no way by which to measure 
what is reasonable compensation for mental and 
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physical pain and suffering, but it is left to the 
sound judgment and discretion of the jury trying 
the case to determine from a preponderance of the 
evidence what is reasonable compensation to com-
pensate the plaintiff for any physical or mental pain 
and suffering he has endured or will probably en-
dure in the future. 
"You are further instructed that you may take 
into consideration loss of bodily function, if any, 
which plaintiff has suffered or which plaintiff will 
probably suffer in the future. 
"In determining the amount of damages re-
ferred to in the first paragraph of this instruction, 
you are further instructed that plaintiff is entitled 
to compensation for his actual loss of past earnings, 
if any, and for any impairment of earning capacity, 
if any, which will diminish his capacity to earn 
money in the future, and in considering this latter 
you may take into consideration the degree and 
character of the loss or impairment of earning ca-
pacity, if any, resulting from his injuries and the 
length of time it will continue, and award to him 
such damages as will fairly and justly compensate 
him for the loss of future earnings, if any, which 
he will probably suffer in the future. 
"You may take into consideration whether the 
injury is temporary in its nature or is permanent in 
its character. 
"The total amount of damages thus assessed for 
all of the above matters must not exceed the sum 
of $30,000.00, the amount prayed for in plaintiff's 
complaint. 
"You are further instructed that the burden 
rests upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence the elements of damage, if any, to 
which he may be entitled." (R. 16, 17, 42, 43.) 
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In the recent case of Brown v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, Case No. 7520 in the files of this court, not yet 
reported, we challenged an instruction almost identical to 
Instruction No. 15 as argumentative. It was not necessary 
for this court to pass upon our contention in reversing the 
judgment in that case. We now therefore renew our charge 
that this instruction is argumentative in form and request 
the court to so hold. We respectfully submit that the over-
all tenor of the instruction is clearly argumentative. In 
addition, the repeated use of the words "compensate" and 
"compensation" throughout the instruction inevitably in-
duces in the jury the impression that liability under the 
Federal Employer's Liability Act is in the nature of work-
men's compensation and is, therefore, independent of a 
determination of negligence on the part of the defendant 
company. 
The vices of this instruction are observable upon ex-
amination of the written word; but they manifest them-
selves many-fold when the same is read aloud to a jury. 
Over a period of years counsel for the plaintiff have "worked 
over" this particular instruction for use in F. E. L. A. cases. 
The requested instruction is constantly in the process of 
being amended and expanded for the definite purpose of 
more fully arguing each case in behalf of the plaintiff. 
Examination of the instruction shows that the first para-
graph thereof advises the jury, in substance, that if the 
issues are found in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant, then it becomes the duty of the jury to award 
the plaintiff damages for such damage as has been sustained 
as a result of the defendant's negligence. Thereafter, 
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throughout the course of the page and one-half of the in-
struction, are delineated various items which the jury may 
take into consideration in fixing the amount of such dam-
ages. Now here in the remainder of the instruction is the 
jury made aware that any recovery is limited to such dam-
ages as were occasioned by the negligence of the defendant. 
If the jurors were attorneys studying such instruction it 
is likely that they would derive a meaning therefrom which 
was not erroneous. But such is is not the fact. The reading 
of such an instruction aloud to a jury consumes some sub-
stantial time so that to a listener the latter part of the in-
struction often seems to be divorced from the first para-
graph. It seems to us that the wording of the instruction 
has been chosen for that very purpose. It is our thought as 
we hear this instruction read in nearly every case which 
we try against plaintiff's counsel that there is a distinct 
likelihood that a juror who hears the latter portion of the 
instruction and who is a layman, untrained in court pro-
cedure, will in many instances receive the impression that 
the plaintiff is entitled to some damages in any event and 
without regard to the matter of the defendant's negligence. 
This court has held that argumentative instructions 
need not and should not be given at the request of either 
party. Illustrative of the principle are the cases of Smith 
V. Gilbert, 49 Utah 510, 164 P. 1026, and Moore v. Utah-
Idaho Central Railroad Co., 52 Utah 373, 17 4 P. 873. In-
struction No. 15 not only argues the matter of damages for 
the plaintiff, but is also prone to be construed to argue 
for the plaintiff that damages should be awarded despite 
the fact that the defendant was not guilty of negligence. 
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In addition to this feature of the instruction, it is to 
be noted that the word "compensate" or the word "corn. 
pensation" is used throughout the instruction no less than 
eight times. We respectfully submit that this repeated use 
of a form of the word "compensation" throughout the in-
struction is a deliberate and intentional effort on the part 
of plaintiff's counsel, acquiesced in by the tri~l court, to 
convey to the jury the impression that liability in an F. E. 
L. A. case is identical to liability under the workmen's com-
pensation statutes. Counsel for the plaintiff argue to every 
jury that the F. E. L. A. is an act provided by Congress 
in lieu of workmen's compensation. This instruction is 
cunningly designed to plant in the minds of the jurors the 
thought that the defendant's liability is as absolute as it 
would be under workmen's compensation laws. No other 
explanation for the repeated use of this word seems rea-
sonable. Counsel well know that they would not be per-
mitted over objection to make an oral argument clearly 
calculated to mislead the jury into the belief that liability 
under the F. E. L. A. is identical to liability under work-
men's compensation statutes. They habitually skirt as 
near to an outright statement to that effect as they dare. 
The very narrow gap between what counsel say in oral 
argument and a direct statement by them to the effect 
that the defendant is liable independent of fault is com-
pletely and effectively filled by the erroneous impression 
created by Instruction No. 15. Not only is the instruction 
therefore subject to the criticism that it argues plaintiff's 
case for him, but also it is subject to the objection that it 
argues an erroneous legal principle. The Supreme Court of 
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the United States has rejected the doctrine that the F. E. 
L. A. is a workmen's compensation act. See Jlllyers v. Read-
ing Co., 331 U. S. 477, 67 S. Ct. 133-1, 91 L. Ed. 1615. There 
the Supreme Court said: 
"The respondent is not subject, as has been sug-
gested, to an absolute liability to its employees com-
parable to that established by a workmen's compen-
sation law. See Griswold v. Gardner, 155 F. 2d 333." 
The tenor of a court's instructions to a jury should 
never be such as to argue the case for either side. Care 
should always be used to see that the instructions given 
are not in their form argumentative, even though they 
may technically be correct. Any lawyer with experience 
in trial of cases by juries made up of laymen knows that 
the members of the jury are often confused and uncertain 
at best so that there can be no justification for deliberate 
attempts to influence them improperly by argumentative 
instructions. A fortiorari the argumentative instructions 
should not be calculated to induce erroneous impressions 
in the minds of such jurors. 
We respectfully submit that a set of instructions gen-
eralized in other parts as were the instructions in the case 
at bar, containing a detailed discussion of the many items 
of damages outlined in Instruction No. 15, constitutes a 
distinct emphasis on the subject of damages rather than 
on the matter of liability, which can only have the effect 
of arguing for plaintiff that he should have some verdict; 
The unfairness of this instruction is further magnified by 
the implication emanating therefrom that liability of the 
defendant is independent of negligence and is identical to 
that of the workmen's compensation. 
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We realize that this court has rarely been disposed to 
reverse a judgment solely upon the basis of argumentative 
instructions. But this instruction was framed in a manner 
likely to result in a misunderstanding by the jury of the 
nature of the defendant's liability. It will be used and re-
used at the request of plaintiff's counsel until this court 
condemns it. 
We wish to mention to the court that the defendant 
attempted to assist the trial court in avoiding this error. 
The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury along 
the customary lines in connection with damages. Defend-
ant's Requested Instruction No. 9 (R. 27) is the ordinary 
damage instruction usually given in personal injury cases 
in this State. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief, we believe that 
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and re-
manded with instructions to enter judgment of "no cause 
of action" for the defendant. We also request that this 
court condemn as argumentative damage instruction No. 
15, so as to eliminate the constantly recurring problem 
presented when plaintiff's counsel request such an instruc-
tion. Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Counsel for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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